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Abstract 
Globalisation has been accompanied by, inter alia, the movement of people from their 
countries of nationality or citizenship to other countries in search of better 
opportunities. Some of these people have been convicted of offences and sentenced to 
imprisonment in countries of which they are non-nationals.  Because of the increase in 
the number of foreign nationals in prisons of different countries, initiatives have been 
taken at international, regional and national levels to transfer these offenders to their 
countries of nationality (administering countries) to serve sentences imposed by courts 
in a foreign country (sentencing countries). The effect is that the imposition of the 
sentence is governed by the laws of the sentencing country and the administration of 
the sentence is governed by the laws of the administering country. Therefore, the 
offender is governed by laws of different countries. Apart from the laws of the 
sentencing and the administering states, there are cases where these offenders are also 
governed by international law and in particular international human rights law. 
Although the rights of foreign offenders are increasingly receiving attention in the 
transfer discourse, one right that appears not to have been emphasised in Africa and 
other parts of the world is the right to family life and how seriously it should be taken 
by those responsible for transferring offenders before they make a decision. The 
purpose of this article is to argue that the right to family life should be taken seriously 
in deciding whether or not an offender should be transferred if the transferred 
offender is to be rehabilitated and ultimately reintegrated into society. 
 
Introduction 
Millions of people are estimated to be living and/or working outside countries of 
their nationality.1 These include Africans who are working in  countries  outside Africa 
and within Africa.2 This mobility has even triggered the international community to 
adopt an international treaty on the rights of migrant workers and members of their 
families.3 Many African countries are grappling with the issue of how to deal with the 
increase in the number of foreign nationals serving sentences in their prisons. 
Statistics show that countries, such as, South Africa,4 Uganda,5 Mauritius,6 Kenya,7 
Ghana,8 Cameroon,9  Namibia10  and Zambia,11  have many foreign nationals in their 
prisons.  This is not a phenomenon unique to Africa.  The increase in the number of 
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f oreign nationals in many countries’ prisons has been the driving force behind the 
adoption of bilateral and multilateral treaties on the transfer of offenders in Europe,12 
the inter-America region,13 North-America,14 Asia15 and within the Commonwealth.16 
There are also many African prisoners in countries, such as, the United Kingdom.17  
One of the issues that arises in the context of prisoner transfer is the right to family 
life. The right to family life, which is not absolute, is guaranteed in regional and 
international human rights instruments that  have  been  ratified  by many African 
countries, such as, the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights18 and the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.19 As will be shown below, the 
right to family life is  also  provided  for  in  the  constitutions  of some African countries. 
This means, in legal pluralism terms, that the right to family life is governed not only 
by the laws of the countries or country in question but also by international human 
rights law. 
 
One of the ways through which countries have dealt with the issue of foreign 
nationals in their prisons is to transfer them to their countries of nationality to serve 
the remainder of the sentence imposed by courts in the sentencing or transferring 
country. In other words, after an offender has served part of his sentence in a prison 
in a foreign country,20 or immediately after the sentence has been imposed, he is 
transferred to complete his sentence in his country of nationality or with which he 
has close ties. This should be distinguished from deportation which almost always 
takes place after the offender has served his sentence in a foreign country and he is 
deported to his country of nationality. In cases of deportation, the offender’s consent is 
not needed – although there are cases where the offender may also be transferred 
without his consent.21 Some countries have, in addition to transfers, emphasised the 
deportation of foreign nationals convicted of serious offences. In both cases of 
deportations and transfers, the issue of the right to family life has to be dealt with. 
There have been cases in the UK, for example, where some politicians have 
reportedly been angered by some judges who have blocked the deportation of many 
foreign offenders on the ground that their right to family life would be violated if they 
were deported.22 This also shows that there can be a tension between different laws in 
a country although they were enacted by the same body.23 One law stipulates that the 
offender in question has to be deported but another law is invoked to prevent the 
deportation of the offender. It is imperative to mention at the outset what this 
article does not deal with. It is beyond the scope of this article to engage with the 
wider discourse on international inter-state prisoner transfer, with international 
human rights law on the right to family life, and with the law, literature and policy 
on prisoners’ rights generally. These issues have been discussed in detail elsewhere 
(see, for example, Easton 2011; Rodley and Pollard 2009; Kaufmann 2002; Probert 
2007; Plachta 1993; Dubinsky, Arnott, and Mackenzie 2012; Van Kalmthout, van 
der Meulen Hofsee, and Dunkel 2007). In this article, the  author  deals  with  10 issues: 
legal pluralism and the transfer of offenders; the conditions which have to be met 
before an offender is transferred; the purposes of the transfer; the right to family life 
in deportation and expulsion cases in international human rights law; transfer of 
offender cases from the United States of America, Canada, the United Kingdom and 
the Republic of Ireland dealing with the right to family life; approaches adopted by 
African countries to transfer offenders; the right to family life in the constitutions of 
http://repository.uwc.ac.za
3 
 
some African countries; the right to family life of prisoners in some African 
countries; jurisprudence from some African countries on the relationship between the 
transfer of offenders and the right to family life; and the issue of human rights 
generally in the context of prisoner transfer. 
 
Legal pluralism and the transfer of offenders and the right to a family 
life: the meaning of law 
It is beyond the scope of this article to define or describe legal pluralism, because the 
meaning of ‘legal pluralism’ has been debated for decades (see Griffiths 1986; Merry 
1988) and is likely to continue to be debated by scholars of different backgrounds, such 
as, lawyers, anthropologists and sociologists. However, mention should be made of the 
fact that legal pluralism ‘is generally defined as a situation in which two or more legal 
systems coexist in the same social field’ (Merry 1988, 870). Tamanaha (2008, 392) has 
argued that the concept of legal pluralism is ‘troubled’ because, inter alia, ‘legal pluralists 
cannot agree on the fundamental issue’ of what law is, and that ‘this issue has never been 
resolved in the legal philosophy and there are compelling reasons to think that it is 
incapable of resolution.’ However, it is submitted that his observation is not applicable to 
the nature of the law that is under discussion in this article, because he made that 
observation after showing that there is a great deal of uncertainty whether different 
normative orderings, such as, customary law, indigenous law, private law, communal 
law etc. could indeed be referred to as law. Merry (1988, 879) also observed that ‘[t]he 
literature in this field has not yet clearly demarcated a boundary between normative 
orders that can and cannot be called law.’ 
 
In the context of the transfer of offenders debate in this article, the discussion will be 
limited to the constitutions of different African countries,24 the relevant pieces of 
legislation enacted by the different legislatures (the two are popularly known as state law 
in the legal pluralism debate), international law and in particular international 
treaties, both bilateral and multilateral, and the jurisprudence emanating from 
international human rights bodies and where necessary from courts. The issue of 
whether case law is indeed law does not arise at least in common law jurisdictions where 
the principle of precedent is well-known. The question of whether international law is 
indeed law is increasingly becoming moot in the light of the fact that states are 
increasingly implementing decisions handed down by international courts or tribunals 
and that some people have been prosecuted and indeed punished for breaking 
international law. Those convicted of war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity 
before international tribunals, such as, the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda,25 
the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia,26 the Special Court for 
Sierra Leone27 and recently the International Criminal Court,28 are examples of how 
breaking international law has consequences. Countries are increasingly enacting 
legislation to grant domestic courts jurisdiction over international crimes committed in 
other countries – under the international law principle of universal jurisdiction. The 
constitutions of different countries also stipulate circumstances in which international 
law becomes part of national law.29 Therefore, there is hardly any contention that all the 
laws referred to in this article are indeed considered by legal pluralists to be laws. 
Whether people obey such laws is a different question. My attention now shifts to the 
discussion of the conditions for the transfer of offenders. 
http://repository.uwc.ac.za
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Conditions for the transfer of offenders in multilateral treaties 
It should be noted that multilateral and bilateral transfer agreements set out various 
conditions required for the transfer of prisoners but it is impossible in this article to deal 
with them in the context of bilateral agreements of which there are hundreds. For 
example, the UK has signed bilateral treaties with over 20 countries (Mujuzi 2012a), 
Canada with 14,30  Hong Kong with 1031  and the USA with 9 (Abbell 2010, 189–250). 
Countries in and the USA with 9 (Abbell 2010, 189–250). Countries in Africa (as will be 
shown below) have also signed bilateral prisoner transfer agreements. 
 
The conditions for the transfer of offenders in stated multilateral agreements will be 
outlined below briefly (for a detailed discussion of these conditions see United 
Nations Office on Drugs and Crime 2012, 25–42). There are four multilateral 
instruments that relate to the transfer of offenders: the Council of Europe’s Convention 
on the Transfer of Sentenced Persons, the Inter-American Convention on Serving 
Criminal Sentences Abroad, the Scheme for the Transfer of Convicted Offenders within 
the Commonwealth and the Council of Europe’s Framework Decision 2008/909/JHA. 
The discussion here will exclude Framework Decision 2008/909/JHA because it is 
limited to the transfer of sentenced persons between European Union Member States. 
The UN Model Agreement on the Transfer of Foreign Prisoners (1985) should also be 
mentioned. Although it is not a treaty that states can ratify, it lays down the principles that 
states are encouraged to consider in drafting bilateral or multilateral treaties on the 
transfer of offenders. The issue of legal pluralism is also evident when it comes to the 
conditions that have to be met before the offender is transferred, because multilateral 
agreements have to be read in tandem with the national legislation on the transfer of 
offenders and, where applicable, the bilateral agreements in place. Practice has shown 
that an offender’s transfer could be governed either by both multilateral and bilateral 
treaties32 or by two different multilateral treaties.33 The fact that an offender meets the 
conditions for transfer in a multilateral or bilateral treaty does not mean that he will 
automatically be transferred. National law, in both the sentencing and the administering 
countries, also has to be considered. It is against this background that in Canada, for 
example, courts have had to intervene to set aside the minister’s decision refusing to 
consent to the offenders’ transfer,34 and in at least one case ordered the minister to 
consent to the offender’s transfer to Canada immediately.35 
 
The first condition is that the offender has to be a national or citizen of the administering 
state.36 Unlike the Inter-American Convention on Serving Criminal Sentences Abroad and 
the Convention on the Transfer of Sentenced Persons, the Scheme on the Transfer of 
Convicted Offenders within the Commonwealth provides that in addition to the fact that 
the offender has to be a national of the administering state, a person who ‘has close ties 
with the administering country of the kind that may be recognised by that country for the 
purpose’ of the transfer may also be transferred. Countries have the discretion to define 
the term ‘national.’37 The issue of legal pluralism becomes important in this context 
when one looks at an example from Canada. Although Canada is a party to the Scheme 
on the Transfer of Convicted Offenders within the Commonwealth, its domestic 
legislation provides that for a person to be transferred to Canada he has to be a Canadian 
citizen (section 2 of the International Transfer of Offenders Act). The Canadian Federal 
Court has held that permanent residents, however close their ties are with Canada, do not 
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qualify to be transferred to Canada (see Catenacci v. Canada (Attorney General) 2006, 
para 25). The second condition for the transfer is that the judgement has to be final.38 
This means that the offender will not be permitted to appeal against his sentence after 
the transfer.39 The effect of this provision is that some offenders have waived their right 
of appeal in order to expedite their transfer.40 
 
The third condition for the transfer is that the offender should still have at least six 
months of the sentence to serve41 or the sentence has to be indeterminate,42 although a 
transfer can also take place even if the remaining period to be served is less than six 
months.43 The fourth condition is that the offender has to consent to the transfer,44 and 
the fifth condition is that the sentencing state and the administering state have to consent 
to the transfer.45 The act or omission of which the offender was convicted has to 
constitute an offence in both the transferring and the sentencing states.46  The Inter-
American Convention on Serving Criminal Sentences Abroad provides that for the 
transfer to take place ‘[t]he sentence to be served must not be the death penalty’47 and 
‘[t]he administration of the sentence must not be contrary to domestic law in the receiving 
state.’48 
 
Purposes of the transfer of offenders 
Foreign national prisoners experience problems, such as, language, cultural and dietary 
(Plachta 1993, 70–80; Dubinsky, Arnott, and Mackenzie 2012, 523; Abbels 2012, 509– 
514). Judge O’Malley of the High Court of Ireland observed in Clive Butcher v. The 
Minister for Justice and Equality that ‘[i]t is accepted that a prison sentence is harder 
for a foreign national with no ties to the State and no likelihood of family visits’ (para 18). 
The main reason, at least in theory, behind the transfer of foreign national offenders is 
humanitarian – to ensure that these prisoners serve their sentences in countries where 
they would not be confronted with hardships they have to face in prisons in foreign 
countries. It should also be noted that such prisoners ‘present special problems to 
prison administrators’ (Commonwealth Secretariat 1987, iii). Linked to the above is the 
issue of rehabilitation of foreign national offenders. It was argued that ‘an offender was 
more likely to be rehabilitated if, at least in the later stages of his or her sentence, he was 
in a place where he was more likely to be subject to the influence of family and friends’ 
(Commonwealth Secretariat 1987, iii). It is against that background that rehabilitation 
and reintegration are mentioned as some of the purposes of the transfer of foreign 
national offenders to their countries of nationality or citizenship. The purposes of the 
transfer of offenders agreements which are mentioned in the Convention on the Transfer 
of Sentenced Persons are to develop ‘international co-operation in the field of criminal 
law’ and that ‘such co-operation should further the ends of justice and the social 
rehabilitation of sentenced persons.’ The preamble to the Inter-American Convention on 
Serving Criminal Sentences Abroad, like the Convention on the Transfer of Sentenced 
Persons, provides that States Parties are ‘inspired by the desire to cooperate to ensure 
improved administration of justice through the social rehabilitation of the sentenced 
persons.’ The UN Model Agreement on the Transfer of Foreign Prisoners (1985) provides 
that ‘[t]he social resettlement of offenders should be promoted by facilitating the return 
of persons convicted of crime abroad to their country of nationality or of residence to 
serve their sentence at the earliest possible stage’ (Article I(1)). Although the Scheme for 
the Transfer of Convicted Offenders within the Commonwealth does not expressly 
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mention that the transfer of offenders is aimed at his or her rehabilitation, its drafting 
history shows that one of its aims is to contribute to the transferred offenders’ 
rehabilitation (Commonwealth Secretariat 1987, iii). However, some commentators (Van 
Zyl Smit and Spencer 2010, 43) have argued that: 
 
[W]hile the early Council of Europe instruments in particular were designed to meet 
humanitarian concerns for offenders who were held in countries other than their own and 
were thus less likely to be ‘socially rehabilitated,’ the focus has increasingly shifted to the 
interests of the sentencing states. These states often want troublesome foreign offenders 
to be returned to their home countries, not because the offenders’ interests would be 
better served by being returned, but because the sentencing states want to be rid of them 
to reduce the burden they place on overstretched resources for the implementation of 
sentences. 
 
That observation is also supported by a statement by the South African Department of 
Correctional Services to the effect that ‘[w]hile the interstate transfer approach is driven 
by the department’s approach to rehabilitation and the inability of effective reintegration 
of foreign nationals into their home countries, such inter-state transfers will also have a 
positive impact on levels of overcrowding’ (Department of Correctional Services 2012, 
57). The above observations should be understood  against the  background that the 
offender’s consent to his transfer is being dispensed with by some countries.49 It should 
be noted that the offender’s consent and his rehabilitation are closely linked. The rationale 
behind including the offender’s consent as one of the requirements for the transfer in the 
Scheme for the Transfer of Convicted Offenders within the Commonwealth is that ‘[i]t is 
rooted in the Scheme’s primary purpose to facilitate the rehabilitation of offenders: 
transferring a prisoner without his consent would be counter-productive in terms of 
rehabilitation’ (Commonwealth Secretariat 1987, 10). There are examples from some 
countries where courts have held that one of the penological goals of prisoner transfer is to 
facilitate the rehabilitation of the transferred offender.50 If an offender is transferred to 
a country where he does not have family support, it is difficult for him to be rehabilitated 
and reintegrated into society. The role of family members in the rehabilitation of 
offenders cannot be overemphasised.51 
 
The right to family life in deportation and expulsion cases: lessons for 
states intending to transfer offenders 
The author is not aware of practice or jurisprudence from any international human rights 
body in which the issue of the relationship between the transfer of offenders and the right 
to family life has been dealt with. Because of the close relationship between the transfer 
of offenders and deportation or expulsion, it is important to highlight how international 
human rights bodies have dealt with the relationship between deportations or expulsions 
and the right to family life. The views expressed by these human rights bodies in 
deportation or expulsion cases could also be applicable in offender transfer cases. The 
issue of family life in deportation or expulsion cases is increasingly being addressed at the 
international human rights level. This shows how the deportation or expulsion of an 
offender is not exclusively governed by the laws of the sentencing state but also by 
international human rights law. In other words, these cases or instances show not only the 
co-existence of domestic law with international law but also the view held by 
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international human rights bodies, consciously or unconsciously, that international 
human rights obligation take precedence over domestic legal obligations (for a detailed 
discussion of legal pluralism in international and regional human rights law see Burker-
White 2003–2004; Tamanaha 2008, 386–390). This principle is expressly provided for 
under Article 27 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (1969) which is to the 
effect that ‘[a] party may not invoke the provisions of its internal law as justification for 
its failure to perform a treaty.’ The Human Rights Committee, the enforcement body 
of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, has prevented Canada from 
deporting convicted foreign nationals on the ground, amongst others, that their 
deportation would violate their right to family life.52  When commenting on Ecuador’s 
periodic reports, the Human Rights Committee concluded that ‘while the Covenant does 
not recognize the right of aliens to enter or reside in the territory of a State party, an alien 
may, in certain circumstances, enjoy the protection of the Covenant, even in relation to 
entry or residence, for example, when considerations . . . [with] respect for family life 
arise’ (see Concluding observations by the Human Rights Committee on Ecuador’s 
fifth and sixth periodic reports 2009, para 18). With regard to Italy, the Human Rights 
Committee regretted the fact ‘that insufficient information was provided on the extent to 
which the right to privacy and family life is taken into consideration by the judiciary 
when the criminal conviction of an alien is accompanied by an expulsion order from 
Italian territory’ (see Concluding observations of the Human Rights Committee on Italy’s 
fifth periodic report 2006, para 18). Thus, the expulsion of an offender is not exclusively 
governed by Italian national laws. It is governed by Italy’s national laws which have to be 
implemented in the light of its international human rights obligations. When 
commenting on Portugal’s periodic report, the Human Rights Committee recommended 
that ‘[t]he State party should amend its legislation in order to ensure that the family life 
of resident and non-resident aliens sentenced to an accessory penalty of expulsion is fully 
protected’ (see Concluding observations of the Human Rights Committee on the third 
periodic report of Portugal 2003, para 17). This is a clear example of a situation where an 
international human rights body recognises that the expulsion of an offender could be 
governed by national law to the extent that it is in full compliance with Portugal’s 
international human rights obligations. If national law is contrary to international law, 
the latter should prevail. This is legal pluralism at work – two normative systems, one 
international and one national, regulating the same social field. 
 
Like the Human Rights Committee, other human rights bodies have also dealt with the 
impact of expulsion on the right to family life. The Committee on the Elimination of 
Racial Discrimination has called upon the Dominican Republic to ‘[a]void the expulsion 
of non-citizens, especially of long-term residents, that would result in disproportionate 
interference with the right to family life’ (see Concluding observations of the Committee 
on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination on the ninth to twelfth periodic reports of the 
Dominican Republic 2008, para 13(c)). The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights has called upon Denmark to ensure that the right to family life of foreign nationals 
is protected (see Concluding observations of the Committee on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights, on the fourth periodic report of Denmark 2004, paras 16 and 29). The 
African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, the enforcement body of the African 
Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, held that the deportation of the complainant from 
Botswana to South Africa violated his right to family life which is protected under the 
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African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights.53 In other words, although domestic law 
sanctioned such deportation, the government of Botswana had an obligation to ensure 
that the law is not implemented in a manner that violates the African Charter on Human 
and Peoples’ Rights. In effect, the right of the individual in question is not only governed 
by the laws of Botswana but also by the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, 
and if there is a tension between the two, the latter takes precedence. As in the UK, 
Portugal, Italy and Canada, in some African countries the issue of the deportation or 
expulsion of foreign nationals has also raised the question of the right to family life.54 
Unlike the position at the international level, at the national level there have been cases 
where courts have dealt with the issue of the right to family life in the context of the 
transfer of offenders. 
 
The right to family life in cases involving the transfer of offenders 
There have been cases in countries, such as, the UK, the United States of America, 
Canada and Ireland, in which the issue of family life has been dealt with or raised in the 
context of prisoner transfer although these cases have not dealt with the transfer of 
offenders to or from Africa. In the light of the fact the author is not aware of any case in 
Africa in which the issue of family life has been dealt with in the context of prisoner 
transfer, it is imperative to briefly have a look at the jurisprudence and practice of the 
aforementioned countries on the issue of family life in the transfer of offenders. 
 
Jurisprudence emanating from courts in the UK shows that the issue of family life has 
come to the fore in the context of prisoner transfer. Courts have held that the possibility 
of the offender being transferred back to the UK to serve his sentence could enable him to 
enjoy his right to family life (see HH v. Deputy Prosecutor of the Italian Republic, 
Genoa; PH v. Deputy Prosecutor of the Italian Republic, Genoa; F-K v. Polish Judicial 
Authority 2012, para 105; Glen Howell v. Deputy Attorney General Court of Appeal of 
Douai France 2012, para 30). The right to family life on its own will not be invoked by a 
court to order the transfer of an offender from the UK to serve his sentence in his country 
of domicile (see The Queen on the Application of Henry Max Shaheen v. The Secretary of 
State for Justice). In The Queen on the Application of Henry Max Shaheen v. The 
Secretary of State for Justice, the Secretary of State in refusing to allow the applicant’s 
application to be transferred to serve his sentence in The Netherlands said that ‘[i]n 
reaching his decision to refuse [the applicant’s] application [he] gave full consideration to 
[the applicant’s] family and residency links with The Netherlands but concluded that 
[his] right to return to the UK at any time following his release from custody in The 
Netherlands outweighed these considerations’ (ibid. para 8). The applicant’s lawyer 
argued that his imprisonment in the UK made it difficult for him to be in constant contact 
with his family, that ‘the maintenance of family contacts is an essential aim of the prison 
system,’ and that transferring him to The Netherlands would enable him to enjoy his right 
to family life (ibid. para 18). The Court, in dismissing the applicant’s application held 
that: 
 
In assessing the proportionality of the decision, I have considered the extent of the 
interference with the claimant’s right to respect for his family life that will result from the 
refusal to consent to the transfer. I fully accept that serving prisoners have Article 8 
rights. But their rights to see members of their families are inevitably and seriously 
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curtailed simply by virtue of their being deprived of their liberty. A decision not to transfer 
a prisoner to a prison where he will be nearer to his family must be viewed in that light. 
Even if a prisoner is transferred to a prison closer to his family, he will inevitably only 
have exiguous rights to see them (para 40). 
 
The right to family life is not absolute and it is one of the factors that the Secretary of 
State could consider in making his decision of whether or not to consent to the offender’s 
transfer from the UK to serve his or her sentence in another country (ibid. para 16). In 
Canada, the issue of family life has also been raised in prisoner transfer cases. Section 10 
(1) of the Canadian International Transfer of Offenders Act (2004) gives the following as 
some of the factors to be considered in deciding whether the offender should be 
transferred to serve his sentence in Canada: the safety of any member of the offender’s 
family, in the case of an offender who has been convicted of an offence against a family 
member (section 10(1)(b)(ii)); and whether the offender has social or family ties in 
Canada (section 10(1)(b)(f)). In most of the cases that have appeared before courts in 
Canada where offenders have sought to be transferred to Canada, one of the factors that 
has been used to motivate for the offender’s transfer is that his family was willing to have 
him transferred to Canada.55 In the USA, the Department of Justice’s Guidelines for the 
Evaluation of Transfer Applications of Federal Prisoners provides that one of the issues 
to be considered in deciding whether or not to consent to the offender’s transfer is the 
likelihood of the offender’s social rehabilitation. In determining whether there is that 
likelihood, factors to be considered include, the offender’s family and other social ties to 
the sending and receiving countries.56 For example, in Mario Alonso Marquez-Ramos v. 
Janet Reno, Attorney General of the United States, the offender’s application to be 
transferred to Mexico from the USA was refused because of, inter alia, his ‘significant ties 
to the United States.’57 Likewise, in Albrecht Pansing v. Michael B. Mukasey, United 
States Attorney General, the Attorney General refused to consent to the petitioner’s 
application to be transferred to serve his sentence in Germany because, inter alia, he was 
‘a domiciliary of the United States, through extended residence in the United States 
and/or presence of family ties and close family member in the United States.’58 In 
Robert B. Coleman v. Janet Reno59 the Attorney General refused to consent to the 
petitioner’s application to be transferred from Canada to serve his sentence in the USA 
because of, inter alia, ‘the apparent weakness of Plaintiff’s ties to the United States.’60 
In Clive Butcher v. The Minister for Justice and Equality, the applicant applied to be 
transferred from the Republic of Ireland to serve his sentence in the UK because he 
wanted to be visited in prison by his elderly ‘mother and family’ in the UK.61 His 
application for the transfer was declined by the respondent and the High Court held that 
it was not clear whether the respondent ‘gave consideration to the applicant’s family 
rights and if so how he balanced them against the public interest’ in coming to the 
conclusion that he should serve the whole of his sentence in Ireland (ibid. para 42). The 
Court held that jurisprudence emanating from the European Court of Human Rights is 
‘sufficient to ground a finding that a request by a prisoner for transfer to his home 
country on the grounds of access to his family is capable of engaging Article 8 rights’ 
(ibid. para 40).62 The above jurisprudence shows that the right to family life is one of the 
factors that are critical in deciding whether or not the offender should be transferred. 
Although none of the above cases dealt with the transfer of an offender to or from Africa, 
there is nothing to suggest that the courts would have come to different conclusions were 
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the offenders in question Africans or wanted to be transferred to Africa or from Africa. 
Courts in Africa, especially in common law jurisdictions, could find the above decisions 
persuasive in cases involving the transfer of offenders within Africa or to Africa. Our 
attention now shifts to the approaches that African countries have adopted on the issue 
of prisoner transfer. 
 
Approaches adopted by African countries to transfer offenders 
Different African countries have dealt with the issue of the transfer of offenders 
differently. Some countries, such as, Mauritius (Transfer of Prisoners Act, Act no. 10 of 
2001), Namibia (Transfer of Convicted Offenders Act, Act no. 9 of 2005), Uganda 
(Transfer of Convicted Offenders Act, 2012), Swaziland (Transfer of Convicted Offenders 
Act, Act no. 10 of 2001), Ghana (Transfer of Convicted Persons Act, 743 of 2007), and 
Tanzania (Transfer of Prisoners Act, Act no. 25 of 2004), Malawi (Transfer of Offenders 
Act, Act no. 25 of 1991), Nigeria (Transfer of Convicted Offenders (Enactment and 
Enforcement) Act, Chapter T16 of 1988) and Zambia (Transfer of Convicted Persons 
Act, Act 26 of 1998), have enacted prisoner transfer legislation. Others have entered into 
bilateral prisoner transfer agreements with other African countries. These include 
countries, such as, Zambia and Namibia,63 Zambia and Mozambique,64 Ghana and 
Nigeria,65 Tanzania and Mauritius66 and Uganda and Mauritius.67 It was reported that 
Nigeria and South Africa had agreed to sign a prisoner transfer agreement.68 Some 
African countries have entered into bilateral prisoner transfer agreements with countries 
outside Africa. These include: Rwanda with the UK (Agreement between the UK and 
Rwanda 2010), Uganda with the UK (Agreement between the UK and Uganda 2009), 
Egypt with the UK (Agreement between the UK and Egypt 1993), Morocco with the UK 
(Agreement between the UK and Morocco 2002), Ghana with the UK (Agreement 
between the UK and Ghana 2008), Nigeria with Thailand,69  Libya with the UK 
(Agreement between the UK and 2008), Libya with the UK (Agreement between the 
UK and 2008), Mali with France70 and Mauritius with India (Agreement between India 
and Mauritius 2006). One African country, Mauritius, has ratified the Council of 
Europe’s Convention on the Transfer of Sentenced Persons.71 The issue of legal 
pluralism is clearly evident here. In countries, such as, Uganda and Ghana, the transfer 
of offenders is governed by different laws: the specific legislation on the transfer of 
offenders; the agreements these countries have signed with other countries; national 
constitutions; and, of course, these countries’ international human rights obligations. In 
the case of Mauritius, the transfer of offenders is governed by the transfer of offenders 
legislation, the Council of Europe’s Convention on the Transfer of Sentenced Persons, 
the agreements with other countries and by international human rights law. In all cases, 
international human rights principles could prohibit the transfer of an offender to 
another country even if such transfer would be legal under domestic law or under 
bilateral agreements. For example, if domestic legislation sanctioned the transfer of an 
offender to a country where there are substantial grounds to believe that he would be 
subjected to torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment in the administering state, 
a country has an international law obligation not to transfer such offender. This 
obligation is derived from, for example, Article 3(1) of the Convention against Torture 
and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (1984) which 
provides that ‘[n]o State Party shall expel, return (“refouler”) or extradite a person to 
another State where there are substantial grounds for believing that he would be in 
http://repository.uwc.ac.za
11 
 
danger of being subjected to torture’ (for a detailed discussion of Article 3 of the 
Convention against Torture see Weissbrodt and H€ortreiter 1995). It is argued that 
although Article 3(1) of the Convention against Torture does not include the word 
‘transfer,’ states parties have an obligation not to transfer a person to a country where 
there are reasons to believe that he would be subjected to torture.72 A country also has an 
obligation not to transfer an offender to a country where it has reason to believe that he 
would be subjected to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. This is the reason 
why the UK has reportedly embarked on renovating prisons in African countries, such as, 
Uganda73 and Nigeria,74 so that offenders transferred from the UK to these countries do 
not challenge their transfers on the ground that they would be imprisoned in inhumane or 
degrading prison conditions.75 
 
In all the above-mentioned treaties and pieces of legislation, the right to family life is 
not mentioned as one of the factors that should be considered before the offender is 
transferred. As will be shown below, jurisprudence emanating from some African 
countries on the transfer of offenders shows that the right to family life has either not 
been mentioned at all or where it has been raised, at least in one instance, the court 
did not consider it to be a compelling reason to order South Africa to enter into a 
prisoner transfer agreement. It is argued that in the light of the recommendations of, 
and the decisions made by, the international human rights bodies and also by the 
African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, the issue of whether or not an 
offender should be transferred is not exclusively governed by national legislation. 
International law has a role to play, and in cases where the transfer of an offender 
would violate his right to family life which is protected under international law, 
although not specifically mentioned in national legislation, the state in question should 
refrain from such a transfer unless there are other compelling reasons to do so. It is 
also argued that in the light of the fact that rehabilitation is considered to be one of 
the main reasons behind the transfer of foreign offenders and indeed the stipulated 
aim of imprisonment in Article 10(3) of the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights,76 the right to family life should be one of the decisive factors in 
determining whether the offender should be transferred. 
 
Right to family life in the constitutions of several African countries 
As mentioned earlier, the right to family life is protected in the constitutions of several 
African countries and in international law. It should be noted that in international law and 
in the constitutions of different African countries, as it will be shown shortly, the right to 
family life is not absolute. Africa is made up of over 50 countries and the space available 
for this article does not permit the author to refer to all the constitutions of all African 
countries. The discussion will, therefore, be limited to examples from a few African 
countries. The Constitution of Uganda (1995) provides that ‘[t]he family is the natural 
and basic unit of society and is entitled to protection by society and the State’ (Principle 
XIX of the National Objective and Directive Principles of State Policy. See also Article 9 
of the Constitution of Egypt (2012)). A Ugandan citizen has a duty ‘to engage in gainful 
work for the good of . . . the family’ (Principle XXIX(b) of the National Objective and 
Directive Principles of State Policy). Article 31 of the Ugandan Constitution provides the 
following ‘rights of the family’: 
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1. A man and a woman are entitled to marry only if they are each of the age of 18 
years and above and are entitled at that age – (a) to found a family; and (b) to equal 
rights at and in marriage, during marriage and at its dissolution.. . .  
2. Marriage between persons of the same sex is prohibited. 
3. Marriage shall be entered into with the free consent of the man and woman 
intending to marry. 
4. It is the right and duty of parents to care for and bring up their children. 
5. Children may not be separated from their families or the persons entitled to bring 
them up against the will of their families or of those persons, except in accordance with 
the law. 
 
The Constitution of Mozambique (Article 65(2)) provides that ‘[c]riminal trial hearings 
shall be public, except in so far as it is prudent to exclude or restrict publicity in order to 
safeguard. . .family. . .’ and that any evidence obtained through the ‘abusive intrusion’ into 
family life is inadmissible (Article 65(3)). The Constitution (Article 105) establishes a 
‘family sector’ and provides in Article 115 that: 
 
1. The family is the fundamental unit and the basis of society. 
2. The State shall, in accordance with the law, recognise and protect marriage as the 
institution that secures the pursuit of family objectives. 
3. In the context of the development of social relations based on respect for human 
dignity, the State shall guarantee the principle that marriage is based on free consent. 
4. The law shall establish forms in which traditional and religious marriage shall be 
esteemed, and determine the registration requirements and effects of such marriage. 
 
The Constitution of Mozambique (Article 120(2)) also provides that ‘[t]he family shall 
be responsible for raising children in a harmonious manner, and shall teach the new 
generations moral, ethical and social values’ and that ‘[t]he family and the State shall 
ensure the education of children, bringing them up in the values of national unity, love 
for the motherland, equality among men and women, respect and social solidarity’ 
(Article 120(3)). Children (Article 121(1)), people with disabilities (Article 125(1)) and the 
elderly (Article 124(1)) have the right to be protected by the family. The Constitution of 
Kenya (2010) protects a person’s right to privacy which includes the right ‘not to have 
- information relating to their family or private affairs unnecessarily required or 
revealed’ (Article 31(c)). Article 45 of the Kenyan constitution protects the right to family 
life in detail in the following terms: 
 
6. The family is the natural and fundamental unit of society and the necessary basis 
of social order, and shall enjoy the recognition and protection of the State. 
7. Every adult has the right to marry a person of the opposite sex, based on the free 
consent of the parties. 
8. Parties to a marriage are entitled to equal rights at the time of the marriage, during 
the marriage and at the dissolution of the marriage. 
9. Parliament shall enact legislation that recognises – (a) marriages concluded under 
any tradition, or system of religious, personal or family law; and (b) any system of 
personal and family law under any tradition, or adhered to by persons professing a 
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particular religion, to the extent that any such marriages or systems of law are consistent 
with this Constitution. 
 
The Constitution of Kenya provides that older persons have a right ‘to receive reasonable 
care and assistance from their family and the State’ (Article 57(d)). The Constitution of 
Namibia (section 14(1)) provides for the right to family and, like the constitutions of 
Uganda, Kenya and Mozambique, provides that men and women shall have a right to 
enter into marriage, marriage shall be entered into with the consent of both parties 
(section 14(2)), and that ‘[t]he family is the natural and fundamental group unit of society 
and is entitled to protection by society and the State’ (Article 14(3)). The Constitution of 
Lesotho provides that every person in Lesotho is entitled to ‘the right to respect for 
private and family life’ (section 4(1)(g); see also section 11(1)). It is silent on the issues of 
marriage and how it should be entered into and dissolved77 and also on the issue of 
bringing up children. The only instance in which the Constitution of Tanzania refers to 
the issue of family life is in the context of the right to privacy by providing that ‘[e]very 
person is entitled to respect and protection of . . . his family’ (Article 16(1)). Article 32 of 
the Constitution of Seychelles (1993) provides that: 
 
5. The state recognises that the family is the natural and fundamental element of 
society and the right of everyone to form a family and undertakes to promote the legal, 
economic and social protection of the family. 
6. The right contained in clause (1) may be subject to such restrictions as may be 
prescribed by law and necessary in a democratic society including the prevention of 
marriage between persons of the same sex or persons within certain family degrees. 
 
The Constitution of South Africa provides that every child has the right to family care 
(section 28(1)(b)), and empowers parliament to enact laws which recognises marriage 
conducted under any family law (section 15(3)(a)(i)). The Constitution of Malawi 
provides that ‘[t]he family is the natural and fundamental group unit of society and is 
entitled to protection by society and the State’ (section 22(1)).78 It adds that ‘[e]ach 
member of the family shall enjoy full and equal respect and shall be protected by law 
against all forms of neglect, cruelty or exploitation’ (section 22(2)). It provides for the 
right to marry and found a family,79 the right not to be forced to enter into marriage 
(section 22(4)), and the age of marriage (section 22(6–8)). The Constitution of Swaziland 
provides that the right to respect of the family is fundamental (Article 14(1)(f)), men and 
women have the right to marry and found a family (Article 27(1)), that marriage shall be 
entered into with the consent of those intending to get married (Article 27(2)), that ‘[t]he 
family is the natural and fundamental unit of society and is entitled to protection by the 
State’ (Article 27(3)) and that ‘[s]ociety and the State have the duty to preserve and 
sustain the harmonious development, cohesion and respect for the family and family 
values’ (Article 27(5)).80 Unlike the above constitutions, the constitutions of Botswana, 
Mauritius and Zambia are silent on the right to a family life. 
 
The above discussion shows that the right to a family is recognised in the constitutions of 
several African countries. As mentioned earlier, the right to family life is also recognised 
in international human rights instruments. This means that in this regard national law 
and international law are protective of the same right. In the constitutions of Uganda, 
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Namibia and Malawi the state and society have an obligation to protect the family. In 
Swaziland this obligation is imposed on the state. This means, inter alia, that if a decision 
is to be made on whether to transfer an offender from the sentencing country to the 
administering country within Africa, one of the questions that should be asked is whether 
such transfer would not violate the right to family life. It should also be recalled that the 
right to family life is unique in the sense that not only does the state have an obligation to 
protect the family, but that this obligation is also imposed on society as a whole in the 
constitutions of Uganda, Malawi and Namibia. This is important in the light of the fact 
that even in respect of absolute and non-derogable rights, these constitutions do not 
impose an obligation on society to protect them. 
 
It is not in dispute that one of the contentious issues in the fields of family law and 
human rights in the world today is whether people of the same sex should have the right 
to get married or to have their relationship recognised by the law. Africa is certainly no 
exception. Cultural and religious grounds have been advanced to oppose same-sex 
relationships in many parts of the world. Homosexuality is an offence in most African 
countries (Human Rights Watch 2008), and at the time of writing South Africa was the 
only African country that had passed legislation permitting people of the same-sex to 
enter into a union (see Civil Union Act, Act 17 of 2006). In some countries such as 
Uganda, Kenya and Seychelles, the constitutions expressly prohibit marriage between 
people of the same sex. Legislation has also been proposed in Nigeria to expressly 
prohibit marriage between people of the same sex.81 The issue of same sex 
relationships could be critical in the transfer of offenders from countries, such as, 
South Africa,82 where same-sex relationships are allowed, to countries, such as, Uganda, 
Kenya, Seychelles and Nigeria, where such relationships are prohibited and to countries 
where homosexuality is an offence. In Chairperson of the Immigration Selection Board v. 
Frank and Another,83 the Supreme Court of Namibia held that a foreign national who 
was in a same-sex relationship with a Namibian citizen could not invoke her right to 
family life to be granted a visa to live in Namibia as she was not recognised as a spouse 
in terms of Namibian law. The court held that Namibian law recognised relationships 
between men and women and not between women and women or between men and men. 
The issue of same-sex relationships could also arise if an offender in such a relationship is 
to be transferred from a country outside Africa where same-sex marriages are legal84 to 
an African country where same-sex relationships are prohibited. 
 
A serious tension between national law and international human rights law in the context 
of the right to family life and the transfer of offenders is likely to arise with regards to the 
issue of same-sex relationships. International human rights bodies have called upon 
states, including African states, such as, Botswana (Report of the Working Group on the 
Universal Periodic Review, Botswana 2009, paras 36 and 37), Togo (Concluding 
observations of the Human Rights Committee on the fourth periodic report of Togo 2011, 
para 14), Namibia (Concluding observations of the Human Rights Committee on the 
initial report of Namibia 2004, para 22), Egypt (Conclusions and recommendations 
of the Committee against Torture on the fourth periodic report of Egypt 2002, para 
6(k)), Ethiopia (Concluding observations of the Human Rights Committee on the initial 
report of Ethiopia 2011, para 12), Malawi,85 Cameroon (Concluding observations of the 
Human Rights Committee on the fourth periodic report of Cameroon 2010, para 12), 
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Burundi (Report of the Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review, Burundi 
2009, paras 19, 24 and 24) and Uganda (Concluding observations of the Committee on 
the Elimination of Discrimination against Women on the combined fourth to seventh 
reports of Uganda, CEDAW/C/UGA/CO/7, 5 November 2010, paras 43 and 44) to respect 
people’s rights to equality and in particular the right not to be discriminated against on 
the ground of sexual orientation. In some countries, such as, Malawi86 and Cameroon,87 
people have been prosecuted for and convicted of homosexuality. A foreign national in a 
same-sex relationship, of course in a country where such relationships are recognised, 
who has been convicted of an offence, can argue that his transfer to a country where same-
sex relationships are prohibited would be in violation of his right to family life, even if he 
were to move to that country with his partner, the relationship would not be recognised 
and he could even end up being persecuted or prosecuted for homosexuality. Such an 
argument would raise the issue of the tension in legal pluralism. The sentencing country 
would be faced with a situation where the right to family life of the offender is governed 
by one piece of legislation (for example, the marriage law) and his transfer is 
governed by another piece of legislation (the transfer of offenders law). The tension 
between the two could be resolved by resorting to another source of law – which is 
international human rights law. The transfer of the offender would perhaps not violate 
national law but international law would oblige the state in question not to order the 
transfer. Our attention now shifts to the discussion of the right of prisoners to family life. 
 
The right of prisoners to family life 
The constitutions of some African countries do not expressly provide that prisoners have 
a right to family life. It is argued that the right to family life that is enjoyed by those 
outside prisons should be enjoyed by those in prison for as long as the exercise of that 
right is in accordance with the prison rules and regulations. This is so for two reasons. The 
first reason is that the same approach has been taken in countries where prisoners are 
allowed conjugal visits (Carlson and Cervera 1991) and artificial insemination.88 In fact 
there have been reports that in Uganda89 and Tanzania governments are contemplating 
allowing prisoners conjugal visits.90 The second reason is that international law prohibits 
discrimination on, amongst others, the ground of social status and other status (see 
Article 2 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights and Article 2 of the 
ICCPR). As mentioned earlier, prisoners are governed not only by the laws enacted by the 
sentencing country but also by international law – that is legal pluralism. If there is a 
tension between national law and international law, Article 27 of the Vienna Convention 
on the Law of Treaties is very clear that a state shall not invoke its domestic law to 
defeat its international treaty obligation. Although the constitutions of some African 
countries provide that a detained person has a right to be visited by their next-of-kin or 
spouse or partner 91 
 
they are silent on the question of whether a sentenced prisoner also has that right.92 Prison 
legislation in some African countries provides that an offender has the right to be visited 
by people, including his relatives or next-of-kin and also to contact the outside world.93 
Legislation in some African countries also provides for the rights of foreign prisoners, 
such as, the right to communicate with the appropriate diplomatic or consular 
representative.94 Section 82(3) of the Ugandan Prisons Act specifically deals with the 
foreign prisoner’s right to family life by  providing that ‘[a] foreign prisoner shall be  
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allowed reasonable facilities to communicate with his or her family. . .’ It is argued that 
the right to family life in the context of prisoners includes the right to be visited by a 
prisoner’s family members. As indicated earlier, prison legislation is not the only law that 
is applicable to prisoners. Prisons are also governed by the constitution and 
international human rights law in terms of which discrimination on any ground is 
prohibited. Even in situations where all laws are state laws, in some African countries, 
such as, Ethiopia, Mauritius, Lesotho, Seychelles, Uganda, South Africa, Nigeria, 
Swaziland Zimbabwe, Kenya, Namibia and Zambia, the constitution is the supreme law of 
the land95 and legislation that is inconsistent with the constitution is invalid. Therefore, in 
countries where legislation allows such visits, this should be understood as protecting the 
right to family life. It is now imperative to have a look at jurisprudence emanating from 
African countries on the issue of prisoner transfer and the right to family life. 
 
Jurisprudence from some African countries on the transfer of 
offenders and the right to family life 
Unlike the situation in some parts of the world, such as, North America and Europe, where, 
as discussed above, there have been a growing number of reported cases on the transfer of 
offenders, thus making it very easy for researchers to analyse these cases,96 the author is 
not aware of many cases on the transfer of offenders in Africa. The cases that the author 
is aware of have been from courts in Malawi, Swaziland and South Africa,97 and those 
from Malawi and Swaziland do not exclusively deal with the transfer of offenders. In 
Malawi a prosecutor argued, though unsuccessfully, that the court should invoke the 
transfer of offenders legislation to order the transfer of a Tanzanian national to 
Tanzania to stand trial for the offences he had allegedly committed in that country.98 The 
court held that the transfer of offenders legislation was inapplicable in this case because 
the person in question had not been convicted. Although this case was about extradition 
for the purpose of trial, it is important for this article because the prosecutor made the 
request in question without ascertaining the impact the transfer would have had on the 
offender’s right to family life, notwithstanding the fact that the Constitution of Malawi 
provides that ‘[t]he family is the natural and fundamental group unit of society and is 
entitled to protection by society and the State.’99 In a case from the Kingdom of Swaziland, 
R v. Machava and Others100, the accused, who were foreign nationals, were convicted of 
drug trafficking and sentenced to between 5 and 7 years’ imprisonment. Before the judge 
imposed the sentence he stated: 
 
[21] Mrs. Dlamini, for the Crown, referred the Court to the provisions of The Transfer 
of Convicted Offenders Act, 2001 and urged the Court to recommend that the Minister for 
Justice should invoke it and request for the convicts in the instant case to be transferred 
to their respective administering countries or those with which they have close ties in the 
event a custodial sentence is imposed. I decline that invitation having particular regard to 
the provisions of section 3 (2) of the Act, which stipulates the persons at whose instance 
the transfer may be made. These include the Minister for Justice, the administering 
country or the convict himself. [22] It is clear that this Court is not one of the parties 
that has the right to initiate such a process and does not appear to have any role in the 
transfer of such a convict. If this country is of the view that these are proper cases in 
which to invoke the provisions of the Act, then the Directorate of Public Prosecutions 
may be the appropriate authority, in the circumstances, to advise and make appropriate 
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recommendations to the Minister. The transfer, it would seem to me, regard being had to 
section 5 (1) (d), would only be consummated once the convicts themselves consent to be 
so transferred. It would therefore be wise to confer with them in any event before any 
decision even to approach the Minister is taken by the Crown in this matter. (ibid. paras 
21 and 22) 
 
The above holding is important because of the fact that the prosecutor did not attempt to 
find out whether the transfer of the offenders would in any way violate their right to 
family life although the Constitution of Swaziland (Article 27(3)) provides that ‘[t]he 
family is the natural and fundamental unit of society and is entitled to protection by the 
State.’ This case also raises an important issue relating to the role of the court in prisoner 
transfer agreements. It is argued that the Swazi prisoner transfer legislation does not 
oust the jurisdiction of the High Court in any way and the court’s reasoning that it has no 
role to play in the transfer of offenders should not be understood as a categorical 
statement that the court cannot intervene in transfer cases under any circumstances. It is 
suggested that if the offender were to argue that his transfer would be contrary to the 
transfer of offenders legislation or to the Constitution, he could challenge the transfer in 
the High Court. Most importantly, if the offender argued that his transfer would violate 
his right to family life and that by transferring him the state would be in violation of 
Article 27(3) of the Constitution which, as we have seen above, states that ‘[t]he family is 
the natural and fundamental unit of society and is entitled to protection by the State,’ 
the court is not barred from intervening to prevent the transfer. In legal pluralism terms, 
the Constitution and the transfer of offenders legislation co-exist in the same social field 
– the transfer of offenders, and there is a tension between the two. It is argued that the 
Constitution is supreme and the transfer of offenders legislation has to defer to it. 
 
The December 2010 High Court of South Africa decision of Patricia Gerber v. 
Government of the Republic of South and Others,101 in which the applicant sought to 
compel the South African government to enter into a prisoner transfer agreement with 
Mauritius, raises the issue of the right to family life in the context of prisoner transfer.102 
The brief facts of the case were the following. In 2007 the applicant’s son pleaded guilty 
to a charge of drug trafficking and the Supreme Court of Mauritius sentenced him to nine 
years’ imprisonment (ibid. para 13). The applicant brought the application on behalf of 
her son (ibid. para 3) and wanted the High Court to order the South African government 
to enter into a prisoner transfer agreement with Mauritius because ‘she and her family are 
suffering physical, emotional and financial strain as a result of’ her son’s imprisonment 
as they were unable ‘to visit him often enough’ as visiting him was straining their 
financial resources (ibid. para 14). She submitted that there was ‘a real need’ for her son 
‘to be returned to South Africa so that he might enhance his opportunities for 
rehabilitation and reintegration into a city and the community once he is eventually 
released’ (ibid. para 14). With regards to the submission that the applicant and her 
family were facing emotional challenges because of their son’s imprisonment in 
Mauritius, the court held that ‘those in themselves are not sufficient grounds to review 
and set aside the respondents’ decision’ not to sign a prisoner transfer agreement with 
Mauritius (ibid. para 45). The court dismissed the application after finding that the 
government had solid policy reasons for deciding that the time was not ripe to enter into a 
prisoner transfer agreement with any country. The above decision shows how the 
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imprisonment of the offender in a foreign country could affect not only the offender’s 
right to a family life but also that of the offender’s relatives. Such imprisonment also has 
an impact on the offender’s prospects for rehabilitation. We now turn our attention to 
the issues of human rights in prisoner transfer arrangements and the purpose of such 
transfers. 
 
Prisoner transfer and human rights 
Human rights issues have emerged in the context of prisoner transfer at both 
legislative and implementation levels. Most bilateral prisoner transfer agreements 
between African countries and the UK deal with the rights of the transferred 
offender, such as, the right not to be subjected to double jeopardy, the right to consent 
to the transfer, the right not to have the sentence aggravated by the administering state 
and the right to be informed of the substance of the transfer agreement. Some of 
these bilateral treaties provide that the offender’s rights to freedom from torture, or 
cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment shall be protected.103 However, 
all legislation and treaties, including the multilateral treaties, are silent on the issue of 
the offender’s right to family life and how relevant it is to the transfer. Practice also 
shows that it is issues, such as, prison conditions and the fairness of the trial,104 that 
have arisen in the prisoner transfer debate. However, there have been arguments that 
the lack of a ‘link’ between the prisoner and the sentencing country should be a factor 
in determining the transfer of such an offender to his or her country of nationality 
without his or her consent. The Explanatory Memorandum to the agreement on the 
transfer of offenders between the UK and Uganda states that: 
 
Most existing prisoner transfer agreements to which the United Kingdom is a party 
require the consent of both States involved, as well as that of the prisoner concerned. It 
is increasingly the case that many foreign national prisoners have no links with the 
country in which they are detained and will be removed at the end of their sentence by 
the authorities. As a consequence international prisoner transfer agreements are moving 
away from the idea that prisoners should have to consent to transfer and therefore have 
the power to exercise an effective veto over the transfer. (para 7) 
 
The above argument shows that in cases where there is a ‘link’ between a foreign 
offender and the sentencing country, the foreign national could argue that he should not 
be transferred to his country of nationality to serve his sentence if he wishes to remain in 
the UK. This ‘link’ to the UK could be understood to include close family ties as it has 
been illustrated above that the right to family life has been hotly debated in the UK with 
regard to deporting from the UK foreign nationals who have been convicted of offences. 
There are some prisoner transfer agreements that make it very clear that the offender’s 
close family ties should be considered before his or her transfer. For example, the 
agreements on the transfer of offenders between the United States and Bolivia (1978) 
and the United States and Mexico (1976) highlight close family ties as one of the issues 
that should be considered before a transfer is ordered. Article V(6) of the agreement 
between the United States and Bolivia provides that: 
 
In making the decision concerning the transfer of an offender and with the objective that 
the transfer should contribute effectively to his social rehabilitation, the authority of each 
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party will consider, among other factors, the seriousness of the crime, previous criminal 
record if any, health status, and the ties that the offender may have with the society of the 
Transferring State or the Receiving State. 
 
Article IV(4) of the agreement between the United States and Mexico provides that: 
 
In deciding upon the transfer of an offender the Authority of each Party shall bear in mind 
all factors bearing upon the probability that the transfer will contribute to the social 
rehabilitation of the offender, including the nature and severity of his offense and his 
previous criminal record, if any, his medical condition, the strength of his connections by 
residence, presence in the territory, family relations and otherwise to the social life of the 
Transferring State and the Receiving state. 
 
If indeed, as mentioned earlier, one of the objectives of the transfer of offenders from 
the sentencing country to the administering country is to facilitate their rehabilitation,105 
then sentencing states cannot ignore the issue of the offender’s family life in relation 
to the transfer. This point has recently been recognised in the Council Frame- work 
Decision 2008/909/JHA.106 Therefore, the issue of the offender’s family life has to be 
high on the agenda in deciding whether he should be transferred. 
 
Another important issue in prisoner transfer which is relevant to family life relates to 
those offenders who qualify for transfer from one country to another. All prisoner transfer 
agreements or treaties and legislation provide that for an offender to be transferred from 
the sentencing country to the administering country, he has to be a national or citizen 
of the administering country. There are some treaties or pieces of legislation which 
provide that apart from citizens, people with close ties to the administering state also 
qualify to be transferred to such states. This is the case with the treaties between the 
UK and Uganda (Article 1(f)(i)), Libya (Article 1(f)(i)), and Ghana (Article 1(f)(i)) and the 
transfer of offenders legislation in Zambia (section 2(1)), Malawi (section 2(1)), 
Zimbabwe (section 2(1)), and Swaziland (section 5(1)(a)). These treaties and pieces of 
legislation do not define what ‘close ties’ are. It is argued that in assessing what these close 
ties are, the relevant authorities in the administering country should consider the family 
ties the offender has in the administering country.107 This will not only ensure that the 
person is reunited with his family but will also ensure that the offender is rehabilitated 
and reintegrated in the society as family support is critical in offender rehabilitation and 
reintegration. 
 
Conclusion 
With globalisation the world has witnessed an increase in the number of people moving 
from one country to another in search of opportunities and safety. Some foreign nationals 
have been convicted of offences and sentenced to imprisonment. Multilateral and bilateral 
agreements on the transfer of offenders have been drafted and legislation has been 
enacted in different African countries to regulate the transfer of foreign offenders. The 
existence of multilateral and bilateral agreements alongside national legislation on the 
transfer of offenders has meant that the transfers are governed by different rules and laws 
that exist alongside one another. Another layer that is added to those laws is international 
human rights law which ‘kicks in’ should the bilateral and multilateral agreements and 
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national legislation fail to protect the offender’s rights sufficiently before, during or after 
the transfer. It has been illustrated that in case of a tension between national law and 
international law, international law takes precedence, and if there should be a tension 
between the constitution and any piece of legislation, the constitutions of some African 
countries state that the constitution is supreme. The author has illustrated the 
importance of the right to family life in prisoner transfer and has argued that it should 
be one of the most important factors that should be taken into consideration in 
determining whether or not the offender should be transferred. If the right to family life 
is not emphasised in prisoner transfer arrangements and agreements, it is likely to be 
very difficult for the transferred offenders to be rehabilitated and ultimately reintegrated 
into society, hence defeating the main objective of prisoner transfer arrangements. 
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Notes 
1. See UN Secretary General’s Message on International Migrants Day, 18 December 
2012 at http://www.un.org/esa/population/migration/2012migrantsday-sge.pdf. 
2. It is estimated, for example, that close to two million Zimbabweans are working in 
South Africa. See Tawanda Karombo, ‘Zimbabwe cash transfer service growing in 
South Africa’ Business Day, 12 April 2013 at 
http://www.bdlive.co.za/business/financial/2013/ 04/12/zimbabwe-cash-transfer-
service-growing-in-south-africa.  
3. International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers 
and Members of their Families. 
4. The exact number of foreign nationals serving prison sentences in South Africa is 
unknown but in June 2011 the Minister of Correctional Services reportedly informed 
parliament that there were 4982 sentenced foreigners in SA prisons. See Sapa, ‘Most 
foreign prisoners from Zim,  Moz’  24  June  2011,  News24  at  
http://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/Most- foreign-prisoners-from-Zim-Moz-
20110624. 
5. It is estimated that 0.8% of the prison population in Uganda are foreign nationals. 
See International Centre for Prison Studies at 
http://www.prisonstudies.org/info/worldbrief/wpb_country. php?country¼51. 
6. It is estimated that 4.9% of the prison population in Mauritius are foreign nationals. 
See International Centre for Prison Studies at 
http://www.prisonstudies.org/info/worldbrief/wpb_country.php?country¼33. 
7. It is estimated that 0.7% of the prison population in Kenya are foreign nationals. See 
International Centre for Prison Studies at 
http://www.prisonstudies.org/info/worldbrief/wpb_country.php?country¼25. 
8. It is estimated that 4.5% of the prison population in Ghana are foreign nationals. See 
International Centre for Prison Studies at 
http://www.prisonstudies.org/info/worldbrief/wpb_country. php?country¼22. 
9. It is estimated that 2.4% of the prison population in Cameroon are foreign 
nationals. See International  Centre  for  Prison  Studies  at  
http://www.prisonstudies.org/info/worldbrief/ wpb_country.php?country¼7. 
10. It is estimated that 5.5% of the prison population in Namibia are foreign nationals. 
See International   Centre   for   Prison   Studies   at   
http://www.prisonstudies.org/info/worldbrief/ wpb_country.php?country¼36. 
11. It is estimated that 2.1% of the prison population in Zambia are foreign nationals. See 
International  Centre for Prison Studies at 
http://www.prisonstudies.org/info/worldbrief/wpb_country.php?country¼52. 
12. See the Council of Europe Convention on the Transfer of Sentenced Persons 1983. 
This Convention and the Additional Protocol thereto of 18 December 1997 have been 
replaced, only in the context of prisoner transfers between EU Member States, by 
Council Framework Decision 2008/909/JHA of 27 November 2008 on the application of 
the principle of mutual recognition to judgements in criminal matters imposing custodial 
sentences or measures involving deprivation of liberty for the purpose of their 
enforcement in the European Union, which now regulates the transfer of offenders in 
the European Union. The Convention on the Transfer of Sentenced Persons and the 
additional Protocol are still applicable to the transfer of offenders between EU Member 
States and other countries and also between non-EU Member States which ratified it. 
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The UK has signed over 20 agreements on the transfer of offenders with countries in 
Africa, Asia and Latin America. See http://www.fco.gov.uk/en/publica- tions-and-
documents/treaties/treaty-texts/prisoner-transfer-agreements. For a detailed discussion 
of these treaties see Mujuzi (2012a). 
13. See the Inter-American Convention on Serving Criminal Sentences Abroad. 
14. The United States of America has signed bilateral prisoner transfer agreements or 
treaties with the following countries: Mexico, Bolivia, Turkey, France, Hong Kong, 
Panama, Peru, Thailand and Canada. 
15. For  example,  China  has  signed  prisoner  transfer  agreements  with  countries,  
such  as, Australia, Portugal and Thailand; Hong Kong has signed prisoner transfer 
agreements with 10 countries: Australia, Italy, the United Kingdom, the Philippines, 
the United States of America, Sri Lank, Thailand, Portugal, France and Belgium (see 
List of Transfer of Sentenced Persons Agreements (Gazette References) at 
http://www.legislation.gov.hk/table5ti. htm); the Philippines has signed prisoner 
transfer agreements with Canada, Cuba, Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, 
Spain and Thailand. Saudi Arabia has ratified the InterAmerican Convention on Serving 
Criminal Sentences Abroad; and some Asian countries such as Japan and Korea have 
ratified the Council of Europe’s Convention on the Transfer of Sentenced Persons. 
16. See the Scheme for the Transfer of Convicted Offenders within the Commonwealth, 
http:// www.thecommonwealth.org/shared_asp_files/uploadedfiles/%7BBF5E0493-DE14-
43D6-A5E8-7641447B2CB1%7D_convicted_criminals.pdf. 
17. It is reported that there are close to 600 Nigerians in prisons in the United 
Kingdom. See Jack Doyle, ‘UK to pay for foreign jails in a bid to repatriate more 
prisoners’ Daily Mail,  26  April  2013  at  http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-
2315548/UK-pay-for-eign-jails-bid-repatriate-prisoners.html. 
18. Article 18 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights 1981 provides: ‘1. The 
family shall be the natural unit and basis of society. It shall be protected by the State 
which shall take care of its physical health and moral. 2. The State shall have the duty to 
assist the family which is the custodian of morals and traditional values recognized by 
the community. 3. The State shall ensure the elimination of every discrimination against 
women and also ensure the protection of the rights of the woman and the child as 
stipulated in international declarations and conventions. 4. The aged and the disabled 
shall also have the right to special measures of protection in keeping with their physical 
or moral needs.’ 
19. Article 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 1966, 
provides for, inter alia, the right to privacy in the context of the family setting. Article 23 
provides that: ‘1. The family is the natural and fundamental group unit of society and is 
entitled to protection by society and the State. 2. The right of men and women of 
marriageable age to marry and to found a family shall be recognized. 3. No marriage shall 
be entered into without the free and full consent of the intending spouses. 4. States 
Parties to the present Covenant shall take appropriate steps to ensure equality of rights 
and responsibilities of spouses as to marriage, during marriage and at its dissolution. In 
the case of dissolution, provision shall be made for the necessary protection of any 
children.’ See also Article 17(1) of the ICCPR. 
20. Some treaties require that before an offender is transferred, he is required to serve a 
certain part of the sentence. See, for example, Article 3(e) of the Agreement between 
the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the 
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Government of the Kingdom of Thailand on the Transfer of Offenders and on Co-
operation in the Enforcement of Penal Sentences 1991. 
21. See Council Framework Decision 2008/909/JHA, supra. In late 2011 Nigeria also 
amended its transfer of offenders legislation to remove the offender’s consent as one of 
the conditions that must be met before the transfer. See also treaties between the UK 
and Rwanda, Libya and Ghana do not require the offender’s consent before the transfer 
takes place. See Mujuzi (2012a, 383). 
22. See, for example, ‘Theresa May criticises judges for “ignoring” deportation law’ 17 
February 2013, BBC News at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-21489072 where it was 
reported that figures from the Home Office suggested that between 2011 and 2012, ‘177 
foreign criminals avoided  deportation . . . after convincing judges of their right to a 
family life in Britain’ prompting the Home Secretary, Mrs May, to accuse some judges 
‘of making the UK more dangerous by ignoring rules aimed at deporting more foreign 
criminals.’ In November 2012, the Home Affairs Committee criticised the UK Border 
Agency for failing to deport as many foreigners convicted of offences as possible. See 
‘Border Agency’s backlog spiralling out of control say Home Affairs Committee’ 8 
November 2012 at http://www.parliament.uk/busi- ness/committees/committees-a-
z/commons-select/home-affairs-committee/news/121109-ukba- rpt-published/. 
23. This has been referred to as new legal pluralism as opposed to classic legal 
pluralism. See generally Merry (1988). 
24. Since Africa is made up of over 50 countries with different legal systems, in this 
article the author refers to constitutions and legislation mostly from common law 
African countries. It is the system with which the author is familiar. 
25. For the status of cases including completed cases by this tribunal see 
http://www.unictr.org/ Cases/tabid/204/Default.aspx. 
26. For the status of cases including completed cases and the sentences imposed see 
http://www. icty.org/action/cases/4. 
27. Most of the cases have been completed and all those convicted by the special court 
were transferred to Rwanda to serve their sentences. One case (of Charles Taylor) is still 
on appeal. See    http://www.sc-sl.org/CASES/tabid/71/Default.aspx. 
28. At the time of writing the ICC has convicted only one offender, Mr Thomas Lubanda 
Dyilo, as a co-perpetrator in recruiting, conscripting and using child soldiers in his rebel 
movement. He was sentenced to 14 years’ imprisonment by Trial Chamber I but he is 
appealing both the conviction and sentence. See  
29. http://www.icc-
cpi.int/EN_Menus/ICC/Situations%20and%20Cases/Situations/Situation%20ICC%2001
04/Pages/situation%20index.aspx. 
30. For example, see section 231 of the Constitution of South Africa (1996); Article 2(5) 
of the Constitution of Kenya (2010); Article 144 of the Constitution of Namibia; section 
211 of the Constitution of Malawi (2004); section 238 of the Constitution of Swaziland 
(2005); and sections 34 and 326 of the Constitution of Zimbabwe (2013). 
31. See  List  of  Countries  acceding  a  Bilateral  Treaty  with  Canada  at  
http://www.csc-scc.gc.ca/international-transfers/004001-0004-eng.shtml. 
32. See List of Transfer of Sentenced Persons Agreements (Gazette References) at 
http://www. legislation.gov.hk/table5ti.htm. 
33. In Roman Eleuterio Smythe v. U.S. Parole Commission 312 F.3d 383 the offender 
had been transferred from Panama to the USA to serve his sentence. The court had to 
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decide whether the offender’s placement on parole had to be decided on the basis of the 
Treaty between the United States of America and the Republic of Panama on the 
Execution of Penal Sentences or the Convention on the Transfer of Sentenced Persons. 
The court held that the bilateral treaty between the USA and Panama was applicable in 
this case. In Corey Darryl Wirsz v. John Sugrue 2010 WL 3957500 (E.D.Cal.) the court 
held that neither the bilateral treaty between the USA and Canada on the transfer of 
offenders nor the Convention on the Transfer of Sentenced Persons provided for the 
offender’s right to be transferred. In John W. Walsh v. Governor Rick Scott, et al. 2012 
WL 3240789 (N.D.Fla.) the petitioner argued that his transfer to Canada should have 
been considered in terms of the Treaty between the United States of America and 
Canada on the Execution of Penal Sentences and not on the basis of the Council of 
Europe Convention on the Transfer of Sentenced Persons. 
34. In United States of America v. Manuel Florez 52 Fed.Appx. 23, 2002 WL 31689057 
(C.A.9 (Mont.)) the court held that neither the Inter-American Convention on Serving 
Criminal Sentences Abroad nor the Convention on the Transfer of Sentenced Persons 
required the district court to recommend that the offender should serve his sentence in 
Mexico. In Clive Butcher v. The Minister for Justice and Equality [2012] IECH 347, the 
applicant, a British national, applied to be transferred from Ireland to serve his sentence 
in the UK. He submitted before the Irish High Court that the respondent’s refusal to 
agree to his transfer was ‘contrary to the spirit and intent of the Scheme for the Transfer 
of Sentenced Persons; is contrary to the Convention on Human Rights and contrary to 
law.’ See para 12. 
35. In the following cases, the court gave the minister 60 days within which to 
reconsider the decision refusing to consent to the offender’s transfer to Canada: Downey 
v. Canada (Minister of Public Safety) 2011 CarswellNat 246, 2011 FC 116, 267 C.C.C. (3d) 
366, 24 Admin. L.R. (5th) 223 para 13; Randhawa v. Canada (Minister of Public Safety 
& Emergency Preparedness) 2011 CarswellNat 1894, 2011 FC 625; and Singh v. Canada 
(Minister of Public Safety & Emergency Preparedness) 2011 CarswellNat 244, 2011 FC 
115, 267 C.C.C. (3d) 361, 24 Admin. L.R. (5th) 70. 
36. Lebon v. Canada (Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness) 2013 
CarswellNat 391, 2013 FC 55 para 16. 
37. Article 3(1)(a) of the Convention on the Transfer of Sentenced Persons; Article III(4) 
of the Inter-American Convention on Serving Criminal Sentences Abroad; Article 
4(1)(a)(i) of the Scheme for the Transfer of Convicted Offenders within the 
Commonwealth. 
38. Article 3(4) of the Convention on the Transfer of Sentenced Persons; and Article 4(3) 
of the Scheme for the Transfer of Convicted Offenders within the Commonwealth. 
39. Article 3(1)(b) of the Convention on the Transfer of Sentenced Persons; Article III(1) 
of the Inter-American Convention on Serving Criminal Sentences Abroad; and Article 
4(1)(b) of the Scheme for the Transfer of Convicted Offenders within the Commonwealth. 
40. However, in the USA an offender who was transferred to Bahamas managed to 
challenge in the USA court, though unsuccessfully, his conviction after the transfer. See 
Jeremy Major v. United States of America 2011 WL 281033 (M.D.Fla.). 
41. In Hugh Stevens v. United States of America 2012 WL 2401384 (W.D.N.Y.) the 
offender waived his right of appeal in order to expedite his transfer from the USA to 
Scotland but his application for transfer was not successful; Samantha Orobator v. 
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Governor of HMP Hollo- way, Secretary of State for Justice [2010] EWHC 58 (Admin) 
para 61 (the offender was transferred to the UK from Laos). 
42. Article 3(1)(c) of the Convention on the Transfer of Sentenced Persons; Article III(6) 
of the Inter-American Convention on Serving Criminal Sentences Abroad. 
43. Article 3(1)(c) of the Convention on the Transfer of Sentenced Persons; and Article 
4(1)(c) of the Scheme for the Transfer of Convicted Offenders within the Commonwealth. 
44. Article 4(2) of the Scheme for the Transfer of Convicted Offenders within the 
Commonwealth; and Article 3(2) of the Convention on the Transfer of Sentenced Persons. 
45. Article 3(1)(d) of the Convention on the Transfer of Sentenced Persons; Article III(2) 
of the Inter-American Convention on Serving Criminal Sentences Abroad; and Article 
4(1)(d) of the Scheme for the Transfer of Convicted Offenders within the Commonwealth. 
46. Article 3(1)(f) of the Convention on the Transfer of Sentenced Persons; and Article 
4(1)(e) of the Scheme for the Transfer of Convicted Offenders within the Commonwealth. 
47. Article 3(1)(e) of the Convention on the Transfer of Sentenced Persons; Article III(3) 
of the Inter-American Convention on Serving Criminal Sentences Abroad. 
48. Article  III(5)  of  the  Scheme  for  the  Transfer  of  Convicted  Offenders  within  
the Commonwealth. 
49. Article  III(7)  of  the  Scheme  for  the  Transfer  of  Convicted  Offenders  within  
the Commonwealth. 
50. As discussed in this paper, Nigeria amended its legislation to remove the  
requirement of the offender’s consent before his transfer. 
51. Holmes v. Canada (Minister of Public Safety & Emergency Preparedness) 2011 
CarswellNat 188, 2011 CF 112, 2011 FC 112, 226 C.R.R. (2d) 220, 267 C.C.C. (3d) 335, 22 
Admin. L.R. (5th) 147, 383 F.T.R. 185 (Eng.) para 7 (Canada); Jerome J. Scalise, et al., v. 
Richard Thorn- burgh, et al. 891 F.2d 640, 645 – 646 (USA). In Regina v. Secretary of 
State for the Home Department, Ex parte Read [1989] A.C. 1014, 1048, the House of 
Lords held that the transfer of offenders is meant to serve a humanitarian purpose. 
52. It is argued that ‘[p]risoners without family support are between twice and six times 
as likely to be reconvicted as those with support from a family.’ See Cavadino 2006. 
53. John Michae€l Dauphin v. Canada, Communication 1792/2008, (HRC, 28 July 2009) 
(Canada attempted to deport a young Haitian who had lived in Canada for most of his 
life) and Jama Warsame v. Canada, Communication 1959/2010, (HRC 21 July 2011) 
(the HRC held that the deportation of the author, who had committed crimes, to Somalia 
where he had no family ties would be a violation of Article 17(1) of the ICCPR). 
54. John K. Modise v. Botswana, Communication 97/93, para 93. See also Article 19 v. 
Eritrea Communication 275/03, para 103, where the African Commission held that the 
incommunicado detention of suspects amounted to a violation of the right to family life. 
55. See,  for  example,  ‘South  Africa:  Deportation  of  Zimbabweans  tearing  families  
apart’ 22  October 2011 at http://www.irinnews.org/Report/94057/SOUTH-AFRICA-
Deportation-of-Zimbabweans-tearing-families-apart. 
56. See, for example, Lebon v. Canada (Minister of Public Safety and Emergency 
Preparedness) 2012 CarswellNat 5014, 2012 FC 1500, 104 W.C.B. (2d) 769 para 16; 
Tangorra v. Canada (Minister of Public Safety & Emergency Preparedness) 2011 
CarswellNat 5406, 2011 FC 1433, 213 A.C.W.S. (3d) 99, 401 F.T.R. 246 (Eng.) para 30; 
Grant v. Canada (Minister of Public Safety & Emergency Preparedness) 2010 
CarswellNat 3432, 2010 FC 958, 373 F.T. R. 281 (Eng.) para 22; Getkate v. Canada 
(Minister of Public Safety & Emergency Prepared- ness) 2008 CarswellNat 2941, 2008 
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FC 965, 236 C.C.C. (3d) 102, 298 D.L.R. (4th) 558, 177 C.R.R. (2d) 49, 333 F.T.R. 121 
(Eng.), [2009] 3 F.C.R. 26, 79 W.C.B. (2d) 435 para 5. 
57. See Department of Justice, Guidelines for the Evaluation of Transfer Applications of 
Federal Prisoners at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/oeo/iptu/guidelines.html. 
58. Mario Alonso Marquez-Ramos v. Janet Reno, Attorney General of the United States 
69 F.3d 477, 478. 
59. Albrecht Pansing v. Michael B. Mukasey, United States Attorney General, 2008 WL 
3861222 (S.D.N.Y.) page 2. 
60. Robert B. Coleman v. Janet Reno 91 F.Supp.2d 130. 60.   Ibid., 131. 
61. Clive Butcher v. The Minister for Justice and Equality [2012] IECH 347 para 5. 
62. In Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform v. Tobin [2012] IESC 37, the 
offender challenged his surrender to Hungary to serve a sentence that was imposed in 
his absence, on the ground that the transfer would violate his right to family life. The 
Irish Supreme Court held that ‘[n]o cases were cited before this Court, and I know of 
none, which prohibit the surrender by a member state of a convicted person to serve a 
sentence lawfully ordered in another member state, on the grounds of interference with 
family life.’ See para 88. 
63. See  Fred  Goeieman,  http://www.namibiansun.com/content/national-news/na-
ratifies-zambia- namibia-prisoner-exchange. 
64. See ‘Zambia and Mozambique sign MoU on the transfer of convicted persons’ 26 July 
2011, Lusaka   Times,   at   http://www.lusakatimes.com/2011/07/26/zambia-
mozambique-sign-mou-transfer-convicted-persons/. 
65. See ‘Ghana, Nigeria to exchange prisoners’ 12 January 2010, Modern Ghana News, at 
http:// www.modernghana.com/print/258677/1/ghana-nigeria-to-exchange-
prisoners.html. 
66. See Agreement between the Government of the United Republic of Tanzania and 
the Government of the Republic of Mauritius on the Transfer of Convicted Offenders, 
First Schedule to the Transfer of Prisoners  (Republic of Tanzania)  Regulations 2008,  
GN No.45 of 2008. 
67. See     http://www.gov.mu/portal/sites/mfamission/addisababa/news.htm. 
68. See ‘Nigeria seeks prisoner swap with South Africa’ Premium Times, 17 May 2013 at 
http:// premiumtimesng.com/news/134749-nigeria-seeks-prisoner-swap-with-south-
africa.html. 
69. See Andrew Agbese, ‘Nigeria: Thailand to Repatriate 500 Nigerian Prisoners’ 4 
December 2000, AllAfrica.com at http://allafrica.com/stories/200012040126.html. 
70. This treaty is referred to in the European Court of Human Rights judgement of 
Soumare v. France, 48/1997/832/1038, 24 August 1998. 
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Convention on the Transfer of Sentenced Persons, para 11, states that: ‘Unlike other 
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outside Europe. Two states – Canada and the United States of America, were, in fact, 
represented on the Select Committee by observers and actively associated with the 
elaboration of the text.’ 
http://repository.uwc.ac.za
27 
 
72. The drafting history of the Ugandan Transfer of Convicted Offenders Act shows 
that Members of Parliament were of the view that no person shall be transferred to  a 
country if there are reasons to believe that he would be subjected to torture. See 
Mujuzi (2012b, 609–612). 
73. See Raymond Baguma, ‘UK Funds Luzira prison rehabilitation’ 4 September 2009, 
The New Vision, at http://www.newvision.co.ug/D/8/13/693494. 
74. See ‘UK to Build Prisons in Nigeria, Plans to send Home 594 Prisoners’ 
http://www.naijahot- 
75. testgist.com/2013/04/27/uk-to-build-prisons-in-nigeriaplans-to-send-home-594-
prisoners/. 
76. The right to freedom from torture, or inhuman or degrading treatment is provided 
for under Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights which is domesticated 
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Constitution of South Africa; section 42(1)(d) of the Constitution of Malawi; and Article 
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members. In Clive Butcher v. The Minister for Justice and Equality supra at para 44 
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